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BLD-037        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2539 
___________ 
 
STEVEN OWENS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN COLEMAN, (Superintendent); SCOTT NICKELSON;  
RONALD HOSTOVICH, (Maintenance Supervisor);  
CARL WALKER, (RHU-Captain); JOHN ALBRIGHT,  
(RHU-Lieutenant); ROBERT HAWKINBERRY,  
(RHU-Lieutenant) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-00328) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
November 5, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
  
 
(Opinion filed: November 10, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
 Appellant Steven Owens appeals from two district court orders granting 
Appellees’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.  Owens is a 
Pennsylvania state prisoner incarcerated at SCI-Fayette.  He filed an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, arguing that Appellees exhibited deliberate indifference to his 
health and safety by housing him unsafe conditions in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  He also claims that Appellees retaliated against him in violation of the First 
Amendment.   
 Owens states that on July 15, 2012, he slipped and fell in his cell, JD-1012, when 
the shower turned on by itself as a fellow inmate was showering in the next cell.  This 
caused water to flood the cell and for Owens to slip and fall when he stood up, incurring 
head, neck and back injuries.  Owens argues that Appellees knew of the unsafe conditions 
in his cell but purposefully failed to correct them.  He avers that the medical staff who 
checked him following his fall informed him that another inmate, Stacey Vance, had 
fallen and incurred injuries in the same shower a few days prior.  Owens states that when 
Vance fell because of the faulty shower in JD-1012 on July 12, 2012, he reported the fall 
to Appellees.  He also avers that Sergeant Dobish told him that several work orders had 
been placed to have the shower repaired prior to Owens’ fall.  D.C. dkt. 3.  Appellees 
were therefore aware of the problem, he argues, and deliberately chose to ignore it, 
posing a substantial risk to Owens’s health and safety.   
 Owens claims that Appellees retaliated against him in two ways.  First, by placing 
him in what they knew to be an unsafe cell, and second, by denying the grievance he filed 
about the faulty shower after his fall.  He claims that Appellee Coleman, who denied his 
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administrative grievance, conspired to deprive him of his civil rights.  He has sued all 
Appellees in both their official and individual capacities. 
 The District Court dismissed Owens’ First Amendment retaliation claims, his § 
1985 conspiracy claim and his claims against all Appellees in their official capacities.  
The Court also dismissed Owens’ Eighth Amendment claims against the supervisory 
Appellees, against whom Owens alleged deliberate indifference on a failure to train 
theory.  The Court declined to dismiss, however, Owens’ deliberate indifference claim 
against Appellees Albright and Hawkinberry, Lieutenants at the Restricted Housing Unit 
(“RHU”) at SCI-Fayette, and Appellee Hostovich, Maintenance Supervisor, on a failure 
to protect theory.   
 The failure-to-protect claims proceeded to discovery, and Appellees filed a motion 
for summary judgment.  The Court granted the motion, concluding that the record lacked 
any evidence that Appellees knew of the unsafe condition in Owens’ cell.  There were no 
work orders to fix the shower in JD-1012 prior to the date of Owens’ fall, and all three 
Appellees’ declarations indicated that they were unaware of the faulty shower until after 
Owens had fallen and reported it.  Additionally, while inmate Vance had slipped and 
fallen in the same cell a few days prior to Owens, Vance did not file a grievance about 
the faulty shower until the day after Owens’ fall; therefore, Appellees could not have 
been aware of its condition prior to that date.  At most, Vance informed Appellee 
Albright of his fall immediately after it happened, and Albright called Maintenance, who 
checked out the shower, cleared the drain, and informed Albright the shower was fine.  
The Court also concluded that, even if Appellees had been aware of the faulty shower in 
 4 
 
JD-1012, a slippery floor is, at most, a sign of negligence, and thus does not give rise to a 
constitutional violation.  The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear 
Owens’ state law negligence claim. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because 
Owens has been granted in forma pauperis status, we review this appeal for possible 
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Our review of orders granting motions to 
dismiss and for summary judgment is plenary.  See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 
363 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating standard of review over an order granting summary 
judgment); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating standard of review 
over dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).  We may summarily 
affirm a district court’s order if an appeal presents no substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 There are no substantial questions presented by this appeal.  The District Court 
correctly dismissed Owens’ claims against Appellees in their official capacities because, 
as employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, they enjoy Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity.  Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-30 (1991).  The Court also correctly 
dismissed his § 1985 conspiracy claim against Appellee Coleman, because he failed to 
demonstrate that Coleman reached an agreement with another person to deprive Owens 
of a constitutional right.  Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 
1993), overruled on other grounds by U.A. Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 
316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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 The Court also correctly concluded that Owens failed to state any First 
Amendment retaliation claims.  To establish a retaliation claim under § 1983, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) that he 
suffered, at the hands of a state actor, adverse action “sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,” and (3) that the protected 
activity was a substantial motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take the 
adverse action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  Owens’ mere 
assertion that Appellees retaliated against him by placing him in a cell with a faulty 
shower does not meet these elements.  Furthermore, his assertion that Appellees denied 
his grievances as retaliation for filing those grievances in the first place does not hold 
either.  The denial of grievances is not an “adverse action” for retaliation purposes.  See 
Burgos v. Canino, 641 F. Supp. 2d 443, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d per curiam, 358 F. 
App’x. 302, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2009); cf. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 
2011) (charging prisoner with misconduct report that was later dismissed for filing a false 
grievance does not rise to the level of “adverse action” for purposes of retaliation claim). 
 The Court correctly dismissed Owens’ Eighth Amendment claims against 
Appellees Coleman and Nickelson on a failure to train theory.  To prevail on such a 
theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a supervisor was on notice of a deficiency in his 
or her training program.  Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).  A pattern 
of similar constitutional violations is typically necessary to demonstrate deliberate 
indifference for purposes of failure to train.  Id.  However, to establish deliberate 
indifference based on a single incident, a plaintiff must show that his injury was an 
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“obvious consequence” of the deficiency in the supervisor’s training program.  Id. at 
1361.  Owens’ complaint falls far short of these requirements.  Not only does it not 
describe the nature of Appellees’ training program, it fails to point to specific deficiencies 
in the program, or explain how those deficiencies caused his injuries.  Furthermore, he 
fails to plead that Appellees were aware or should have been aware of any such 
deficiencies.   
 Finally, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to Appellees’ 
Albright, Hawkinberry and Hostovich on Owens’ Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference claim based on a failure to protect theory.  Prison officials must provide 
humane conditions of confinement by ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical care.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).  A 
prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when the prison official’s act or omission 
results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and when he 
is deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety.  See id. at 834.  Therefore, a prison 
official can be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions 
of confinement if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and 
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.  See id. at 847.  
Claims of negligence, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute 
“deliberate indifference.”  See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dept. Of Corrections, 266 F.3d 
186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 The summary judgment record does not contain evidence that these Appellees 
knew of the unsafe condition in Owens’ cell.  Owens has provided no evidence to 
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demonstrate that there are disputed material facts regarding whether Appellees knew that 
his cell posed an unreasonable risk to inmate health and safety.  He avers that Sergeant 
Dobish told him that several work orders had been placed to have the shower repaired 
prior to Owens’ fall, and that Appellees were therefore aware of the problem and 
deliberately chose to ignore it.  D.C. dkt. 3.  He has supplied no evidence, however, to 
support this assertion.  “A party resisting a [summary judgment] motion cannot expect to 
rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.”  Gans v. Mundy, 
762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.1985).  “One cannot create an issue of fact merely by denying 
the arguments of the opposing party without producing any supporting evidence of the 
denials.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).   Rather, as the District 
Court noted, the summary judgment record reveals that there were no work orders placed 
to fix the faulty shower in JD-1012 until after Owens reported his fall, Appellees declared 
that they were unaware of any plumbing problems in his cell prior to his injuries, and 
Vance did not submit a grievance about the faulty shower in JD-1012 until after Owens’ 
fall.   
 Because Owens’ appeal presents no substantial question, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  Owens’ “Application for relief” is denied. 
